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ASSOCIATED FISHERIES OF MAINE, INC. v. DALEY:
IS DISCRETION THE BETTER PART
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Steven E.B. Lechner
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States District Court for the District of Maine recently
upheld a groundfish recovery plan that amended the Northeast Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan.' This recovery plan, known as Amendment 7,
was submitted by the New England Fishery Management Council to
Secretary of Commerce William Daley, who adopted and implemented the
proposed regulations.2 Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. (AFM)3
challenged Amendment 7, promulgated in response to the perceived threat
to specific fish populations in the New England region AFM claimed that
the changes made by Amendment 7 were financially destructive for small
fishing vessels, particularly the trawling industry in the area, and thus
violated federal law.5
In upholding Amendment 7, the district court held, inter alia: (1)
judicial review was not available on the claim that the Secretary violated
the Regulatory Flexibility Act;6 (2) the Secretary adequately considered
public comments about tougher restrictions on fishing vessels and did not
engage in arbitrary and capricious rulemaking in violation of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act;7 and (3) the Secretary adequately complied with the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act's national
standards and general purposes
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. 383 (D. Me. 1997).
2. Ia at 385.
3. Id
4. The specific fish populations at risk are cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder. Id.
5. Id
6. Id at 387.
7. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388.
8. l at 388-390.
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This Note summarizes the district court's assessment of AFM's claims.
A brief survey of the Magnuson Act will be provided, followed by an
analysis of the court's review of AFM's Magnuson Act claim. The most
significant part of the district court's review of the Secretary's implementa-
tion of Amendment 7 was its relationship to the Magnuson Act's goal of
groundfish stock conservation, and its effect on New England's commercial
fishing industry. This Note argues that the court's deference to the Secre-
tary's adoption and promulgation of Amendment 7 was justified. More-
over, the Note argues that the court's approach in Associated Fisheries of
Maine, Inc. v. Daley is an appropriate model for the proper role of judicial
review in Magnuson Act claims.
II. ASSOCIATED FISHERIES OF MAINE, INC. v. DALEY
A. Facts
William Daley, United States Secretary of Commerce, adopted and
implemented amendments to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Manage-
ment Plan submitted by the New England Fishery Management Council. 9
The Council recommended changes to counteract a perceived threat to the
cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder populations in the New England
fishery.1"
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. (AFM), a membership organization
comprising and representing Maine commercial fishermen," challenged
two specific amendments adopted by the Secretary.'2 AFM originally
brought suit in 1994 to challenge Amendment 5,13 promulgated March 1,
1994,4 which was adopted and implemented to curtail depletion of the
9. The New England Fishery Management Council is comprised of members from Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The Council has seventeen
voting members:
(1) the Regional Administration of the National Marine Fisheries Service;
(5) the principal state official with marine fishery management responsibility for
each state, and;
(11) eleven members nominated by the governors of the states and appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce for three year terms.
NEFMC Web Page (visited Apr. 17, 1998) <http://wwwl.shore. net/-nefmc/overview/
structure.htm>.
10. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc., v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 385.
11. Id. at 386.
12. Id. at 385.
13. Id.
14. Id.
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
aforementioned groundfish stocks."5 Amendment 7, promulgated on May
31, 1996,16 went further than Amendment 5, by seeking to rebuild stocks by
reducing groundfish mortality to near zero."1 AFM brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Maine challenging this later
Amendment on several grounds," but generally claiming the Amendment
was destructive to Maine's commercial fishing industry.' 9
B. The Court's Analysis
1. Secretary's Standing Challenge
The Secretary claimed AFM lacked standing to bring a suit challenging
Amendment 7.' The district court disposed of this claim, finding that
AFM met the two-pronged test for standing"' as enunciated in DuBois v.
United States Department of Agriculture.'2 The first prong of the test,
constitutional in nature, required the plaintiff to "have suffered an injury in
fact"' that was "personal to the plaintiff,"'24 and was "actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical."'  The injury must also have been "fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief."26 The court found that Amendment 7
"directly affected" commercial fishing,27 thus meeting the first prong of the
DuBois test.
15. ICE
16. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc., v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 385.
17. Id "F' symbolizes the portion of the total mortality rate of the stock attributable to
fishing-related mortalities in a given year. Id. at 385, n.2.
18. Id at 383-91. AFM challenged Amendment 7 based on the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Magnuson Act, Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,866, and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997. Id. at 385.
19. Id. "Associated Fisheries asserts that both Amendments are disastrous for small
fishing boats-particularly the trawling industry-in the area." IM
20. Id at 386.
21. Id
22. DuBois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1V Cir. 1996) (involving
a citizen and environmental group's action against the U.S. Forest Service for issuing a
permit for expansion of askiingfacility which allegedly violated the National Environmental
Policy Act, Clean Water Act, and executive order).
23. Id at 1281.
24. Id
25. Id-
26. Id
27. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 386.
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The second prong assessed the prudence of exercising federal jurisdic-
tion.28 Normally, a plaintiff "must assert [his] own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests
of third parties."2 9 However, as a membership organization, AFM plainly
fits into an exception to this general rule because "one or more of the
members certainly would satisfy the individual requirements for standing
in... [their] own right."3
2. AFM's Regulatory Flexibility Act Claim
AFM first claimed the Secretary's adoption and implementation of
Amendment 7 violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) "by failing to
perform an adequate final regulatory flexibility analysis."'" The language
of the RFA in effect at the time that the Secretary promulgated Amendment
7 specified three requirements for an agency's final regulatory flexibility
analysis.32
Of these requirements, AFM specifically attacked the Secretary's
failure to consider the negative impact that Amendment 7 would have on
the small commercial fishing boat industry,33 and the Secretary's failure to
find and assess ways to minimize these economic hardships.'
28. DuBois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d at 1281.
29. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975)).
30. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 386.
31. Id.
32. The RFA in force at the time that the Secretary promulgated Amendment 7
mandated that every final regulatory flexibility analysis contain the following:
(1) a succinct statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule;
(2) a summary of the issues raised by the public comments in response to the initial
regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of the assessment of the agency of such
issues, and a statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result of such
comments;
(3) a description of each of the significant alternatives to the rule consistent with the
stated objectives of applicable statutes and designed to minimize any significant
economic impact of the rule on small entities which was considered by the agency, and
a statement of the reasons why each one of such alternatives was rejected.
5 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1994), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 604(a) (Supp. H 1996).
Although changes were made to the RFA prior to the May 31, 1996 promulgation of
Amendment 7, these changes were not scheduled to come into effect until June 27, 1996.
Thus, the court reasoned that AFM's RFA claim should be decided under the prior statutory
scheme. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387.
33. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387. AFM was
particularly concerned with Amendment 7's effect on trawlers and other small businesses.
Id.
34. Id.
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
The district court concurred with AFM's claim that the Secretary failed
to fully examine every alternative;35 However, the RFA required that
agencies examine only "significant alternatives."36  The court found
evidence of satisfactory compliance by the Secretary in the public com-
ments portion and in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for Amendment 7, stating that "much of the eighteen pages that
are the comments and responses portion of the final rule are directed to a
discussion of alternatives," and that the Environmental Impact Statement
included "many alternatives."37
3. AFM's Administrative Procedures Act Claim
AFM's second claim alleged that the Secretary violated the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).38 The APA required the reviewing court to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law[.] ' 39
AFM claimed that the Secretary engaged in arbitrary and capricious
rulemaking by failing to "conscientiously consider" public comments about
Amendment 7,4 specifically the decision to alter the fishery management
strategy to a goal of near zero groundfish mortality.4 The court found
ample evidence within the administrative record that the Secretary consid-
ered public comments about Amendment 7 and about groundfish mortality
reduction.42 The court stated that "eighteen pages of the final rule.., were
devoted to a discussion of [public] comments and responses[,]"'43 and an
inter-agency memorandum analyzed public opinion and comments item by
item." The court thus concluded that the Secretary's rulemaking showed
35. Id "Associated Fisheries may be correct that not every alternative has been
considered by the agency .... Id
36. 5 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1994) amended by 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3) (Supp. II 1996).
37. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387.
38. Id.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
40. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387. AFM characterized
the comment period as "just an empty exercise." Id.
41. 1 at 388.
42. Id
43. Id.
44. Id.
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a fair consideration and treatment of the comments and was not arbitrary
and capricious.45
4. AFM's Magnuson Act Claim
The Magnuson Act created a system in which regional councils devise
fishery management plans which are submitted to the Secretary for ultimate
approval and implementation.' The majority of the district court's opinion
in Associated Fisheries was dedicated to an analysis of AFM's claim that
the Secretary failed to comply with four elements of the Magnuson Act. To
assess the Secretary's adoption and implementation of Amendment 7, the
court permitted each side to present expert testimony about the scientific
and economic information at issue in the case.47
First, AFM claimed that the Secretary based his decision on unreliable
scientific information rather than on the best science available. 8 Specifi-
cally, AFM challenged groundfish species population data,49 and the
Secretary's failure to assess the presence of factors other than overfishing
as the reason for the groundfish depletion. The court characterized the
"best science available" requirement as a highly subjective standard.5' The
court further described disagreements about scientific data as a difficulty
to be expected, 2 and stressed that a reviewing court must find an abuse of
discretion by the Secretary to overturn decisions based on science.53 The
court found merit in both sides' experts5 4 which meant that the Secretary's
decisions based on available science were deemed plausible.
45. Id.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (1994).
47. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388. The court's
permission to present this testimony was based on language in the Magnuson Act which
states that "measures shall be based upon the best scientific information available." 16
U.S.C. § 1851 (a)(2) (1994).
48. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 389. The court
characterized AFM's best science available allegation as follows: "The science is generally
unreliable inasmuch as there are problems with the quantitative data concerning species
population and the inability to say with confidence that factors other than overfishing... are
not at work in depleting the groundfish." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. AFM pointed to environmental factors. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 389-90.
54. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 389. "[T]he record
reflects... strenuous disagreement among the scientists ..... Id.
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
Second, AFM claimed that the Secretary's economic analysis of
Amendment 7, as compared to Amendment 5, was deficient in three
respects.55 AFM alleged that the economic analysis failed to consider the
impact of Coast Guard enforcement costs, 56 incorrectly treated crew
payments as costs, 7 and misjudged the economic benefits in the final three
years of the plan. Similar to the debate about the best scientific data, the
court found that the Secretary's consideration of the Coast Guard's budget
estimate and treatment of crew payments as costs was not arbitrary and
capricious." The court held that reasonable economists could differ about
these particular decisions.' The court agreed with AFM's assertion that
uncertainties existed about the projected benefits Amendment 7 would have
in years eight, nine, and ten of the plan.61 The court commented "there will
be drastic effects for the fishing industry,"' but, the court found that this
economic uncertainty was not tantamount to clear evidence that the
Secretary failed to make a "good faith judgment" about the best way to
proceed for all interested parties.63
Third, AFM alleged the chosen regulatory practices had greater
detrimental effects than "equally effective alternatives."'  The court,
having earlier addressed the Secretary's consideration of proposed alterna-
tives, described these choices as "discretionary judgments," which in this
case were not arbitrary and capricious.65
Finally, AFM claimed Amendment 7 was adopted and promulgated
before Amendment 5 had had a reasonable chance to reduce groundfish
mortality.' The court rejected the assertion that the Secretary is confined
to an earlier solution, and found instead that the Secretary was free to make
changes based on new data.67 The court held that the Secretary, in adopting
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 1d&
58. Id
59. Id.
60. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 389. "Economists can
argue in good faith over whether crew payments should be treated as a cost, but it is hardly
arbitrary and capricious for the Secretary to make the choice to treat them as such in the
analysis." Id.
61. 1I
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 1ai
65. lUi
66. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 389.
67. 1&
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and implementing Amendment 7 after having adopted and implemented
Amendment 5, responded to new information and made appropriate
alterations to achieve the goal of "preserv[ing] the fishery to obtain its
optimum yield."68
5. AFM's Other Claims
AFM also claimed that the Secretary violated two Executive Orders
and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997.69 Executive Order (E.O.)
12,291 targeted federal regulation and sought to "reduce the burdens of
existing and future regulation, increase agency accountability,, 70 and
"insure well-reasoned regulations."'', To achieve this end, section two of
E.O. 12,291 required agencies to base decisions on adequate information
and weigh the resulting societal costs and benefits.72
AFM posited that because the Magnuson Act required compliance with
the specified time limitations in E.O. 12,291 and other laws, "as they apply
to the Secretary," 73 the Magnuson Act mandated total compliance with the
language of E.O. 12,291. 7' The court interpreted this language as applica-
ble only to time limits. 75 In addition, the court found that E.O. 12,291 was
inapplicable because it was explicitly revoked by E.O. 12,866.76
Executive Order 12,866 also outlined principles and guidelines for
regulatory decisions, but explicitly limited its intent to improvement of the
"internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or equity by
a party against the United States .... The court held that this language
proscribed AFM from having a private cause of action based on E.O.
12,866.78
AFM lastly claimed that the Secretary's implementation of Amendment
7 was barred by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id.
70. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
71 Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 390.
75. Id. "All section 1855(e) instructs is that the time limits in the Magnuson Act must
be observed." Id.
76. Id. The revocation became effective on September 30, 1993. Id.
77. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 358 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
78. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 390.
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
which prohibited "funds appropriated under [the] Act... [to be] used to
develop new fishery management plans, amendments, or regulations which
create new individual fishing quota programs.... ."9 The court found that
Amendment 7 was not a quota program, because it did not limit "access to
the fishery for individual vessels or fishermen to a percentage of the total
allowable catch."'8 The court opined that even if Amendment 7 was a
quota program, the Sustainable Fisheries Act authorized offsetting fees to
pay the administrative costs of "individual fishing quota programs.""1
II. MAGNUSON ACT
A. A Brief Survey
No limitations on commercial fishing beyond the United States' three
mile territorial sea existed prior to 1976.82 In that year, overfishing by
foreign vessels led Congress to enact the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act). 3 The Act established
a zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending 200 miles from the
U.S. coast, in which no foreign fishing was permitted. Regional Fishery
Management Councils were created to exercise American fishery manage-
ment authority over all fish within this zone85 through the development of
Fishery Management Plans (Fps).86
79. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)
(codified as amendedat 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (West Supp. 1998).
80. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 391.
81. Id. See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 109(c)(2), 110 Stat.
3559,3583 (1996) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
82. Sarah Bittleman, Toward More Cooperative Fisheries Management: Updating
State and Federal Jurisdictional Issues, 9 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 349, 352-354 (1996).
83. Ido Warren Grant Magnuson (1905-1989) served as a Democratic Senator from
Washington state from 1944 to 1981. United States Senate (visited Jan. 19, 1998)
<http://www.senate.gov/history/nameindex/m.htm>.
84. Catherine Decker, Note, Issues in the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and ManagementAct, 1 OCEAN& COASTAL LJ. 323,324 (1995). The United
States established "exclusive management authority... over all living resources within this
zone." Ido
85. Bittleman, supra note 82, at 357.
86. Decker, supra note 84, at 357.
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B. Successes and Failures of the Magnuson Act
The general purpose of the Magnuson Act, as enacted in 1976 and
through its subsequent amendments, was to create a comprehensive system
of fishery conservation and management. 7 A reduction of foreign fishing
in the EEZs has been achieved,8 which in turn has increased domestic
fishing. 9 American vessels' gross annual catch has increased from 1.56
billion pounds in 1977 to over 6.32 billion pounds in 1993.90 This dramatic
growth in American fishing has produced an equally dramatic growth in
annual fishing revenues and created thousands ofjobs.9' In turn, this goal's
achievement produced negative effects on the conservation component of
the legislation, specifically the groundfish stock levels.92
Overfishing has been, and in many cases continues to be, the primary
reason for the perceived threat to many groundfish species.93
"Overutilization," a measurement of fishing volume, occurs when fishing
effort exceeds fish production.94 The northeast region has suffered the
greatest percentage of overutilization stocks in the United States.95 This
reality has produced severe economic impacts on New England's tradi-
tional commercial fishing industry.96 The New England region's ground-
fish landings declined from more than 1.6 billion pounds in 1965 to less
than 220 million pounds in 1991. 9'
Shortly after the enactment of the Magnuson Act, the New England
Regional Council created their initial FMP which placed quotas on total
fishing of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, regulated fishing net size,
and established a minimum size for cod and haddock.98 One criticism of
87, Eldon V.C. Greenberg & Michael E. Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery
Conservation Zone: A New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55
S. CAL. L. REv. 641 (1982). The Magnuson Act also "redefined the scope of the remaining
state jurisdiction." Id.
88. Decker, supra note 84, at 323. "Perhaps its greatest success, the Act effectively
eliminated foreign fishing within the 200-mile band now known as the exclusive economic
zone." Id.
89, Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 324.
93. Id.
94. Decker, supra note 84, at 337.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 338.
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
this FMP was its failure to control the entry of new vessels into the
fishery." This unregulated competition for a finite resource created a "race
to fish,"''" to catch as many fish as possible before total limits were
reached, and to reduce the amount of fish available to competitors.
10
'
The New England Regional Council altered their policy in 1980 by
establishing less restrictive measures, and then increased the minimum size
of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder in 1987." 2 In response to the
continued decrease in groundfish stock levels, the Northeast Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan was amended on March 1, 1994 to avoid further
depletion,0 3 and amended again on May 31, 1996 to place tougher restric-
tions on fishing vessels and rebuild groundfish stocks."
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MAGNUSON AcT CLAIM IN
ASSOCIATED FISHERIES OF MAiNE, INC. V. DALEY
Judicial review of the Secretary's implementation of FMPs accords
another check in this process. In Maine v. Kreps," s the State of Maine
challenged species quotas on Georges Bank established by the Secretary.
Kreps was decided shortly after the passage of the Magnuson Act, and the
First Circuit took the opportunity to enunciate the discretion a reviewing
court should give to quotas set by the Secretary "in the exercise of [his]
conservation and management authority under the Act."'" The court stated
that the Secretary has "substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate
quota for a given fishery""° adding that a reviewing court "may decide only
whether this discretion was exercised rationally and consistently with the
standards set by Congress, and may not substitute its own judgment as to
values and priorities for that of the Secretary."' 8
National Fisheries Institute, Inc. v. Mosbacher,' 9 is another illustrative
case regarding proper judicial review for Magnuson Act claims. National
99. Id.
100. Decker, supra note 84, at 340-41.
101. IU.
102. Id. at 338-39.
103. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 385.
104. Id.
105. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1052 (1st Cir. 1977). Maine wanted the First Circuit to
"clarify for the future the limits of the Secretary's authority." Id. at 1056.
106. Id. at 1055.
107. I&
108. Id. (citation omitted).
109. National Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1990).
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Fisheries challenged the Secretary's regulation of billfish harvest." 0 The
court analyzed the administrative record and held that the Secretary's
actions were justified based upon conservation factors,' and furthermore
that the Secretary was not limited to conservation considerations."'
Overall, the court showed deference to the Secretary's selected solutions,
which were held not to be arbitrary and capricious." 3
In Associated Fisheries, Judge D. Brock Homby applied the Kreps
standard of review to non-quota Magnuson Act regulations."' The district
court gave three principle justifications for its appropriate deference to the
Secretary's adoption and implementation of Amendment 7. 15
First, the court both explicitly and implicitly relied on the mechanics
of the Magnuson Act."6 Decisions made under the Magnuson Act must
survive several checks Congress placed in the system such as: the Regional
Council's structure," 7 the inclusion of public comment and participation
throughout the process;" 8 the requirement of submitting FMPs for the
Secretary's approval;" 9 and most importantly, Magnuson Act regulations
must comport with the Act's ten national standards. 20 The court stated that
"the administrative record demonstrates that comments were consid-
ered.''. Implicit in the court's holding was the belief that the Magnuson
Act was enacted to give affected parties a voice in this process. 22 Amend-
ment 7 represented a plan that properly progressed through this process.
Critics argue that the public participation invited by the Magnuson Act is
ineffectual." AFM alleged the Secretary "failed to conscientiously
110. Id. The challenged regulations in National Fisheries had the "effect of significantly
reducing the domestic commercial harvest of Atlantic Ocean billfish while also limiting the
recreational harvest to a lesser degree." Id. at 211.
111. Id. at226.
112. Id. at 219. The D.C. Circuit applied a "common sense construction of the term
'conservation and management,' in which the two words do not have synonymous and
redundant meanings." Id.
113. Id. at 226-27.
114. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388.
115. Id. at388-91.
116. Id.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1985 & West Supp. 1998).
118. Id. §§ 1852-54.
119. Id. § 1853(c).
120. Id. § 1851(a). When the case arose there were just seven national standards. See
Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388.
121. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388.
122. See id. at 388-391.
123. Decker, supra note 84, at 341-42. The conflicts of interest among voting members
of the Regional Councils has been identified as a defect in the Magnuson Act's public
Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
consider comments responding to Amendment 7.''124 The court found that
the record showed the Secretary properly considered public input and did
not engage in arbitrary and capricious rulemaking.'"
Second, the court intimated that the fishery management issues before
it were highly subjective and complex. 26 Judge Homby allowed expert
testimony to help him "understand science, economics, statistics, fishery
management principles and the fishing industry."'27 Opponents of judicial
deference in Magnuson Act claims argue that courts should analyze each
detail of challenged fishery regulations."2 The Associated Fisheries court
heard detailed testimony and found merit in each party's experts.'29
However, the court stressed that these issues required the Secretary to make
"assessment[s] [that are] obviously a matter of judgment and discretion,"
and must be reviewed on this basis. 30
Lastly, the district court stated "there is not much disagreement that the
[New England] ground fishery is in bad shape[.]'' The court also
recognized that "the New England fishing industry is facing a monumental
crisis[," 3'' and even agreed with AFM's contention that Amendment 7
would have a drastic effect on the commercial fishing industry. 33 In the
end, however, the court stressed the "uncertainties" of the fisheries'
future."M The court rejected AFM's claim that Amendment 5 should have
been given a chance to work, stating "[tihe Secretary is not limited to an
earlier solution if new data show that the fishery is in direr straights than
previously thought."' 35 The court ostensibly focused on the long term
effect of the Secretary's actions and whether they comported with the
Magnuson Act's goal of preserving the fishery to obtain its optimum
yield. 36 The court found appropriate the Secretary's choice to "be conser-
review process. See id.
124. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387.
125. ld. at 387-88.
126. M at 388.
127. ld.
128. See Alison Rieser &William J. Milliken, A Review of Developments in U.S. Ocean
and Coastal Law 1990-1991, 1 TERRrTORIAL SEA J. 291, 333 (1991).
129. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387.
130. Id. at 389.
131. Id.
132. l
133. Id. "[Flor many communities a traditional way of life is at stake." Id.
134. Id.
135. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 389.
136. Ial at 390. "[Ihe primary area of disagreement is how rapidly [the fishery] must
be permitted to recover." Id. at 389.
1999]
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vative in dealing with the issue of conservation and, in the face of uncer-
tainty, to take the more strenuous measures-even though they may
unfortunately have a short term drastic negative effect on the fishing
industry."'137 The court correctly relied on the Magnuson Act's broad
optimum yield goal as paramount in assessing the Secretary's actions, and
only regulations clearly inconsistent with this goal should be found
impermissible.
V. CONCLUSION
The Associated Fisheries court showed proper judicial deference to the
Secretary of Commerce's adoption and implementation of Amendment 7.
This amendment represented a proposed solution proffered by the New
England Regional Management Council to deal with a critical groundfish
population problem.1 38 The Associated Fisheries court reviewed Amend-
ment 7 to ensure that the groundfish recovery plan complied with the
Magnuson Act's goal of achieving optimum yield. 139 As stated in Kreps140
and restated in Associated Fisheries, "[a] reviewing court may decide only
whether this discretion was exercised rationally and consistently with the
standards set by Congress... and may not substitute its own judgment as
to values and priorities for that of the Secretary." 14'
Amendment 7 represented a deliberate response to a grave and uncer-
tain future for the New England fishery. The Secretary's adoption and
implementation of this groundfish recovery plan was appropriate and
warranted by the circumstances. By showing deference to the Secretary,
the Associated Fisheries court showed faith in the Magnuson Act's system
and gave the groundfish recovery plan an opportunity to work. This
approach should serve as a model for other courts throughout the nation in
reviewing challenges to fishery regulations implemented under the Magnu-
son Act.
137. Id. at 390.
138. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Recovery
Measures for New England Groundfish Approved, press release (1996).
139. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 390.
140. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d at 1055.
141. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 388.
